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INTRODUCTION
Modern phones carry a unique and diverse array of sensors, used primarily to
provide the user with what we now expect of any given smartphone. For example,
accelerometers measure acceleration in three-dimensional space, and in combination
with your phones gyroscope, enable it to detect when you want your applications
in portrait or landscape mode.1 When these two sensors, and others as well, are
correlated with inputs from GPS satellites, an increasingly detailed picture of a
users location is formed.2 This location data provides an amazing array of map
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2022. A heartfelt thanks to my
friends and family. Without their support, I could not have completed this Note, nor any part
of my academic career.
1
David Nield, All the Sensors in Your Smartphone, and How They Work, GIZMODO
(June 29, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://gizmodo.com/all-the-sensors-in-your-smartphone-and
-how-they-work-1797121002.
2
See id.
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services and has, to some extent, trained consumers to depend on these services for
travel to unfamiliar destinations.3
Such services come at a cost, minor to most: providing user location data to a
company for its own use. Often, this has no individual consequence. Most companies
use the location data to turn a profit. For example, Google uses such data to better
individualize and target advertisement.4 Increasingly, however, this location data is
being requested by the government in the form a geofence warrant. When a geofence warrant is served on Google, this warrant queries every user in Googles
database of location data, called the SensorVault.5 Very few known investigative tools
have the scope, in both space and time, to affect every Google user who has, at one time
or another, enabled Location History on their Android device or Google account. 6
This Note begins by focusing on the technology and procedure of geofence
warrants in Part I. Because an understanding of both the technology and procedure
is ultimately required to make any headway in later legal analysis, this step is necessary.
The heart of the legal analysis is undertaken in Parts II and III.
In Part II, this Note argues that law enforcement requests for location data require
a warrant: either because of the expectation of privacy in location data proposed by
cases such as Carpenter v. United States7 or because some courts have found that
Carpenters holding must mean location data should be treated as content, which
triggers a statutory warrant requirement under the Stored Communications Act. 8
In Part III, having established a warrant is necessary, this Note further argues
geofence warrants can satisfy the probable cause and particularity requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. For probable cause, the government must narrowly tailor
the warrant to objective, established facts, avoiding the incidental capture of other
users as much as possible. For particularity, in a similar sense, the government must
use ex ante limitations on the warrant that restrict the capture of data to only those
individual users for whom probable cause has been established, permitting as little
officer discretion in the execution of the warrant as possible. Courts view the Fourth
3

See Nathaniel Sobel, Do Geofence Warrants Violate the Fourth Amendment?, LAWFARE
(Feb. 24, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-geofence-warrants-violate-fourth
-amendment [https://perma.cc/3AHB-6B3T].
4
Privacy & Terms: How Google Uses Location Information, GOOGLE, https://policies
.google.com/technologies/location-data?hl=en-US [https://perma.cc/7NVK-LK6M] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
5
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnet for the Police, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-location
-tracking-police.html [https://perma.cc/WSG3-ZFNA].
6
See Jennifer Lynch, Googles Sensorvault Can Tell Police Where Youve Been, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/googles-sensor
vault-can-tell-police-where-youve-been [https://perma.cc/9TR2-2PBF].
7
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
8
18 U.S.C. §§ 27012713.
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Amendment through the lens of what is reasonable: a narrow geofence warrant is
better, all things considered. To effectively tackle these complex Fourth Amendment
issues, this Note begins with technology and procedure of a geofence warrant itself.
I. THE TECHNOLOGY AND PROCEDURE OF GEOFENCE WARRANTS
On a Monday afternoon in May 2019, surveillance footage captured images of
a man holding a cell phone up to his ear outside the Call Federal Credit Union in
Midlothian, Virginia.9 Moments later, police alleged that same individual entered
the bank and robbed it of $195,000 in cash, fleeing the scene with the money.10
After weeks passed with no leads, law enforcement applied for a search warrant. 11
In the probable cause affidavit, law enforcement proposed that, as a result of the
observed cell phone use outside the credit union, and because many cell phones use the
Android operating system, evidence of the bank robbery might well be on Googles
servers.12 The evidence specifically sought was the unknown suspects location data,
which could show his movements directly before, during, and after the robbery.13
The search warrant briefly described above is the topic of this Note and is known
as a geofence warrant. Their structure is usually common: a suspect is observed
with a cell phone or assumed to have one on his or her person because of their ubiquity
in daily life.14 Two premises are assumed from there. First, many phones either run
Androids operating system or interface with a Google Account and Googles servers
when accessed by a non-Android phone.15 Second, many users enable Google location services when setting up a Google Account.16 With those premises in hand,
9

Deanna Paul, Alleged Bank Robber Accuses Police of Illegally Using Google Location
Data to Catch Him, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technol
ogy/2019/11/21/bank-robber-accuses-police-illegally-using-google-location-data-catch-him/
[https://perma.cc/QA85-VZ6W].
10
Id.
11
See Affidavit for Search Warrant at 1, United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19-cr-130 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/fc0182fd-fe6c-452f-b31f-d7a63acc
135a/edva-geofence-warrant.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMU4-8QGD].
12
Id. at Attachment III, 45.
13
Id. at Attachment II, 23.
14
See, e.g., Application for Search Warrant at Attachment III, In the Matter of Accounts
associated devices that were inside the following geographical area: NW Corner 35.7840570°,
-78.644821°, NE Corner 35.784018°, -78.643561°, SE Corner 35.782758°, -78.643574°, SW
Corner 35.782797°, -78.644853° during the following time frame: 1930 hours Eastern and 2200
hours Eastern, on 3/16/2017, data maintained on computer servers controlled by Google, Inc.
(N.C. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Wake Cnty. May 5, 2017) [hereinafter Raleigh Devices Geofence
Warrant], https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4388574-20170505-arson-warrant.html
#document/p3/a410682 [https://perma.cc/B5JC-DH5V] (assuming that an unknown suspect
has a cell phone without any corroborating evidence to indicate that fact).
15
See id.
16
See id.
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Googles SensorVaultthe database that holds the location data of all Google users
may very well hold evidence of the specific crime at hand. This final fact explains
much, because the SensorVault likely holds billions of records of relatively mundane activity, among which could well be evidence of any given crime.
A perhaps more descriptive name for a geofence warrant is a reverse location
history search warrant.17 This is because the search focuses on a given location (and
time) to find an unknown suspect or witness to a crime.18 The bank robbery case is
illustrative. In that case, law enforcements warrant application proposed that Google
conduct a SensorVault search query where the geographic boundaries of the search
would be limited to a 150-meter circle centered on the Credit Union.19 The query
would be further limited by time: the hour-long span during which the robbery occurred.20 Googles production returns would include anonymized location data of
any user within the boundaries.21 Individuals included in these production returns are
subject to discovery only because of geographic and time constraints. As such, innocent individuals with no direct relation to the crime can be and often are included
in the anonymized device IDs.22
Commonly, and sometimes referred to as step one of the procedure, the device
IDs returned to law enforcement are subject to analysis: executing officers will sift
through the anonymized data for patterns that suggest which of the anonymized
accounts are persons of interest to the crime and which ones are not.23 In the bank
robbery example, nineteen device IDs were returned within the given boundaries.24
Surveillance footage showed that there was only one visible suspect during the
robbery.25 Unclear as to which device ID was the suspects phone, law enforcement
refined their interest in the location data to nine of the nineteen device IDs.26
Beyond this point, some geofence warrants rely on the initial authority of the
warrant for more data in a second round, refined by the data of step one. This can
17

Paul, supra note 9.
Raleigh Devices Geofence Warrant, supra note 14, at Attachment II (establishing two
metrics(1) geographic space and (2) recorded timeto restrict the SensorVault search query).
19
See Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note 11, Attachment II at 3.
20
Id. at 2.
21
Id.
22
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Google LLC in Support of Neither Party Concerning Defendants Motion to Suppress Evidence From a Geofence General Warrant at 1214, United
States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19-cr-130 (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Google Amicus Brief].
23
See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 5.
24
Frank Green, Defense Challenges Use of Google Location Data from Everyone in
Vicinity of Hull Street Road Bank Robbery, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://richmond.com/news/local/crime/defense-challenges-use-of-google-location-data-from
-everyone-in-vicinity-of-hull-street-road/article_9e4f9ca6-d092-5f07-b932-b111553a114d
.html [https://perma.cc/DU4H-PUL6].
25
See Sobel, supra note 3.
26
See Green, supra note 24.
18
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be referred to as step two of the procedure: law enforcement obtains further information on these refined device IDs beyond the initial space and time constraints.27
As the company usually subjected to such legal procedures, Google explained that
law enforcement can compel Google to provide additional contextual location
coordinates beyond the time and geographic scope of the original request.28 While this
is usually limited by a time constraint listed in the original warrant,29 it is not usually
limited by any space or geographic constraint. As a result, the refined device IDs
location data in this step can be traced as far as it may have traveled based on this
original time constraint.30
Using the anonymized data from step one, and step two if so conducted, law
enforcement officers interpret and analyze the returns to try to determine which is
from a suspect, witness, or unhelpful bystander. This can be referred to as step three.
Following this, law enforcement often attempts to obtain further legal process to deanonymize the returns. In some examples, law enforcement relies on the original
search warrant to compel Google to provide account-identifying information for
the anonymized device numbers that [law enforcement] determines are relevant to
the investigation.31 In most cases, Google will provide accompanying information
related to the Google account more generally, called subscriber information, which
can include a name and a linked Gmail account.32 Returning to the bank robbery as
an example, law enforcement compelled Google to provide non-anonymized information on three persons.33
Armed with basic information on these suspects, and correlating this data with
eyewitness evidence,34 law enforcement arrived at the home of Okello Chatrie, the
alleged perpetrator. Prosecutors obtained an indictment against Chatrie for the bank
robbery.35 In United States v. Chatrie, now before the U.S. District Court of the
27

Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 1314.
Id.
29
See Affidavit of Scott Kibbey, In the Matter of the Search of Information Regarding
Accounts Associated with Certain Location and Date Information, Maintained on Computer
Servers Controlled by Google, Inc. at 9, United States v. Guevara-Gonzales, No. 1:18-mj-00
169-ML (W.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2018), ECF No. 9-1; see also Raleigh Devices Geofence Warrant,
supra note 14, Attachment I ¶ 3 (describing that after an initial review of anonymized device
IDs, Google, Inc. shall produce contextual data points with points of travel outside of the
geographic area for a further thirty minutes before and after the original search parameters).
30
See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 5 (visualizing the scope of the location information
provided at this stage of the process).
31
See Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
32
See id.
33
Sobel, supra note 3.
34
See id.
35
U.S. Attorneys Office, E.D. Va., Press Release, Man Indicted for Armed Robbery of
Credit Union, U.S. Dept of Just. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/man
-indicted-armed-robbery-credit-union [https://perma.cc/6CZR-W3Q5].
28
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Eastern District of Virginia, the defendant has filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained through the geofence warrant, claiming the warrant is an unlawful and
unconstitutional general warrant . . . both overbroad and lack[ing] the particularity
required by the Fourth Amendment.36 The case remains in preliminary litigation
and a ruling on whether to suppress the evidence is outstanding.37
It will be useful to summarize the procedure for claritys sake. A geofence warrant
typically proceeds as follows: After a crime occurs at location x, using Google maps,
law enforcement overlays a circle centered on a coordinate at location x or uses a set
of coordinates to form a simple polygon that encompasses location x.38 In addition,
they choose a time frame within which the suspect or suspects were likely to be
present at location x.39 Using these geographic and temporal parameters, or multiples
of them, law enforcement applies for a warrant that would compel Google to run a
search query for all possible Google users that could have been present within the
parameters.40 The anonymized device IDs given by Google show the location data
of users who were in the constraints. In some instances, the police will use this data
to refine their search, either seeking further legal process or relying on the authority
of the initial warrant. Sometimes, when relying on the initial warrant, law enforcement will compel information about these users in increasing levels of detail beyond
the initial constraints, relying on other constraints in the initial warrant. 41 Finally, in
some cases, the police will compel the subscriber information of those device IDs
narrowed down throughout this process.
It seems unmistakable that this investigative tool holds great potential for solving
complex crimes that would otherwise never be solved. For this, and other reasons,
the use of these geofence warrants is becoming more and more common.42 Google
estimates that the company has seen a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence
requests [] received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased
over 500% from 2018 to 2019.43
Examples of geofence warrants like the one described above emphasize that trial
courts will face unique and novel questions that implicate our complicated relationship
with technology, monopolized markets, and the ubiquity of smartphone use. To address
this, this Part continues in two short subparts. First, although user privacy has become
36

Defendant Okello Chatries Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from a Geofence
General Warrant at 1, United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19-cr-00130-MHL (E.D. Va. Oct. 29,
2019), ECF No. 29.
37
United States v. Chatrie (3:19-cr-00130), COURTLISTENER, https://www.courtlistener
.com/docket/16215471/united-states-v-chatrie/ [https://perma.cc/27BT-RA62] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
38
See Lynch, supra note 6.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 2.
43
Id. at 3.
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a hot button issue, location data is so valuable that data companies have an incentive
to encourage users to provide very precise movement patterns. This profit motive outweighs privacy concerns and ensures that geofence warrants will be an issue for the
immediate future. Second, the average user (and legal practitioner) is likely unaware of
the accuracy of modern location tracking. This accuracy influences the analysis of
whether society is prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in location data
and whether location data can be construed as substantive content in and of itself.
A. The Value of Location Data
Here, two main points are stressed. First, the location data retained in Googles
SensorVault implicates a vast number of Americans: potentially anyone with a Google
account that enabled Location History at one time in the past.44 Second, because of
the profit model of advertising, this location data is more valuable than most realize.
These two premises emphasize many other aspects of the issues described throughout, namely that this investigative tool is powerful, can affect millions of Americans,
and is likely to remain relevant for some time.
Google began its rise to data supremacy in the online search business. While not
without competitors in online searches, Google is currently peerless in terms of
market share and profit.45 It is projected that Google will have earned $39.58 billion
through U.S. advertising in 2020 alone.46 Such profits are driven by innovation,
particularly by algorithmically tailoring advertising to consumers preferences,
which can and does use location data provided by user accounts which have enabled
Googles Location History feature.47
The specific way that Google tracks location is described further below.48 Setting
aside the precise technological means, to enable the full functionality of an Android
phone, or if using certain apps on an iOS phone, a user must set up a Google account.
Google then prompts the user to enable Location History services. For most Android
users, this is one prompt among many, of which some percentage will enable such
44

Although it is very likely law enforcement requests geolocation information from other
data companies, this discussion focuses on Google because their collection and retention of
geolocation data has produced the most public scrutiny and analysis.
45
According to open-source statistics site Statista, as of June 2021, Google had a search
engine market share of 87.76 percent. Joseph Johnson, Global Market Share of Search
Engines 20102020, STATISTA (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573
/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/TX9D-JF9W].
46
Lauren Feiner, Google U.S. Ad Revenue Will Drop for the First Time This Year,
eMarketer Says, CNBC (June 22, 2020, 10:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/22/google
-ad-revenue-will-drop-this-year-emarketer-says.html [https://perma.cc/A3DP-95NC].
47
Google has been in the location tracking business since at least 2009. See Ian Paul,
Google Latitude Service Lets You Track Your Friends: How It Works, PCWORLD (Feb. 4,
2009, 7:42 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/158909/google_latitude_tracks.html [https://
perma.cc/B4MM-PHJ3].
48
See infra Section I.B.

538

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:531

services.49 Just like searches, which are free, Googles Location History provides
users with enhanced functionality for the free Google Maps application and others.50
Just like searches,51 Location History is attributable to a certain Google account, and
optimizes the picture of that user overall.52 Location data can sometimes be gleaned
by other means, including applications on the Android OS which request it. These
Location History users can provide better advertising revenue, which itself is a
demonstrable means of enhancing profits.53 The number of Android OS phone users
utilizing Location History services is projected to reach 131 million in 2021.54
The overall point made here is that Google, and companies like it, have a strong
incentive to promote the use of location services. This will affect a large portion of
the American population. It is clear that enough people do opt in to some form of
location data sharing to make Googles SensorVault dataset an invaluable tool for
tackling serious problems,55 including the pursuit of unknown suspects.
B. The Accuracy of Location Data
With a few simple affirmative responses, a user may transmit their location in
return for increased functionality of their phone. Here, it is proposed that the accuracy in this data makes a difference in legal analysis. In short, the patterns revealed
in location data represent something like a personal log of an individuals interactions with society.
A smartphone device56 with a Google account, data services on, and Location
History enabled will transmit the location of that device based on multiple different
49

Precise statistics about the use of Google Location History are not publicly available.
See Privacy & Terms: How Google Uses Location Information, GOOGLE, https://pol
icies.google.com/technologies/location-data [https://perma.cc/H7GL-YSBU] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
51
See Privacy & Terms: Advertising, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/technologies
/ads?hl=en-US [https://perma.cc/4YLE-J6V9] (noting that advertising might be based on your
app activity or . . . web activity connected to a Google account) (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
52
See GOOGLE, supra note 50 (noting that, if a user opts in and is reporting location in
their device settings, the precise location of your signed-in devices will be collected and
stored, even when youre not actively using a Google product or service.).
53
See Mike Brown, How Google Maps Will Make Money on Your Restaurant Searches,
INVERSE (Apr. 28, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://www.inverse.com/article/30916-google-maps
-makes-money [https://perma.cc/SV4R-ZNHG].
54
S. ODea, Android Smartphone Users in the United States 20142022, STATISTA (Mar. 1,
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/232786/forecast-of-android-users-in-the-us/ [https://
perma.cc/7MAT-Q8KU].
55
Tony Romm et al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use Smartphone
Location Data to Combat Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 9:15 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/ [https://
perma.cc/8KT7-E6F7].
56
This includes iOS phones that have installed a Google account and enabled Location
History.
50
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inputs: GPS and Bluetooth signals, Wi-Fi connections, [] cellular networks57 all
provide a reading on the phone, as well as internal sensors like accelerometer[s] and
barometer sensors, . . . gyrometer and magnetometer sensors . . . .58 Reporting indicates
that this layering of multiple inputs provides location tracking of a device accurate
to within a few yards and with a pattern that is updated in some cases . . . more
than 14,000 times a day.59 Thus, a geofence warrant, which relies on this location
data, can precisely follow a user from the scene of a crime to their home and every
place in between: be that a doctors clinic, middle school, or place of worship. 60
Everyday users and legal practitioners alike may not realize the accuracy and
scope of the location data obtained by Google. In its Amicus Brief, Google had to
actively differentiate Location History data from other types of cell phone data when
discussing it in the context of geofence warrants.61 Thinking back to the bank robbery
example, the Chatrie case, the parties there made comparisons between Google
Location History data to recent precedent on cell phone location data.62 But representatives for Google clarified Location History data as unique. This location data
is predicated on opting in and is considerably more precise than other kinds of
location data considered by the Supreme Court and other courts. 63
The accuracy of this data, when combined with an option to opt into the service,
has led representatives of Google to characterize the data as more akin to a journal,
or personal log, of the individuals public movements.64 This admission is meaningful because it recognizes and elevates the decision made by the user in accepting
location services. Only after user action is there a log of personalized location data
drawn from the sensors described above.65 Further, and regardless of a users volition,
57

See Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 7. Although Google emphasizes the many
steps a user must make to configure a device to send precise data to the Google Sensorvault,
location-reporting settings default to the highest accuracy possible.
58
Letter from Susan Molinari, Vice President, Google, to Senators Richard Blumenthal &
Edward Markey (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05.11.2018
%20-%20FTC%20-%20Google%20Location%20History.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHK9-3VH6].
59
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and
Theyre Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/inter
active/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html (demonstrating the accuracy of
the technology in the context of apps which use the same methods of location tracking).
60
Id. (documenting that similar forms of location data tracking showed patterns of movement
within a pregnancy clinic, childrens schoolyard, and megachurch). Geofence warrants raise
other important constitutional questions, chief among them First Amendment concerns. Those
questions are beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the Fourth Amendment issues.
61
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 810.
62
Explained in greater detail infra at Part II.
63
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 910.
64
Id. at 6.
65
See Letter from Senators Richard Blumenthal & Edward J. Markey to Joseph Simmons,
FTC Chairperson (May 11, 2018), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05.11
.2018%20-%20FTC%20-%20Google%20Location%20History.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHK9
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the accuracy of this data can unto itself be reflective of habits, patterns, and perhaps
even personality characteristics.66 This data is openly comparable to other forms of
personal logging, such as diaries, itineraries, or schedules, suggesting a strong privacy
interest for that data. Relying on these ideas, Part II examines whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy should exist in location data.
II. LOCATION DATA: IS A WARRANT REQUIRED?
A. The Retrieval of Location Data Is a Fourth Amendment Event Requiring a
Warrant
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.67
Historical analysis of this period strongly suggests that authors of the Fourth
Amendment structured its language, at least in part, to respond to and prevent
general warrants.68 These types of warrants typically left a great deal of discretion
to the officer who held the warrant, leading to the usual problems with a subjective
application of authority, such as arbitrary and oppressive enforcement.69 In response,
the authors of the amendment included what is known as the warrant clausethe
second part of the amendmentwhich includes the requirements of probable cause,
the swearing by oath or affirmation to the facts supporting the warrant, and the
particularity requirement.70
-3VH6] (Once a user allows Location History in one application, they enter into the expansive
and continuous collection of location data . . . .).
66
Clemens Stachl et al., Predicting Personality from Patterns of Behavior Collected with
Smartphones, 117 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATL ACAD. OF SCI. 1768017681, https://www
.pnas.org/content/pnas/117/30/17680.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P63-C8XT].
67
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 625, 65565 (1999); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers Intent: John Adams, His
Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 104451 (2011) (noting that proposals of
a right against unreasonable searches and seizures by Madison, Adams, and [] previous state
constitutional provisions all condemned general warrants.).
69
See Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the Courts,
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 123 (2007).
70
An analysis of two of these requirementsprobable cause and particularityis
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As the Supreme Court has noted, it is perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment
was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the
plain language of the first clause of the Amendment.71 As such, a legal request that
does not qualify as a search or seizure does not require a warrant at all.
This Note attempts to answer the threshold question as to whether this legal
request for Location History information is a search, seizure, or subject to a statutory
requirement necessitating a warrant. The ultimate conclusion here is that recent
precedent suggests a reasonable expectation of privacy in location data.
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Location Data
As stated, it is presumptively unreasonable to conduct a search or seizure of data
without a warrant.72 As such, and in practical terms, the Note is here inquiring
whether, because the request for that data is not a search or seizure, the government
could request location data from a company like Google with legal process short of
a warrant, such as a subpoena.
It is a possible oversimplification, but in most early claims of violations of the
Fourth Amendment, the defendant usually focused on some sort of physical trespass,
which itself constituted a search.73 As a result, for most of the Courts history, the
physicality of searches meant that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
were usually defined as tangible property rights.74 Recently, members of the Court
championed this idea as still valid: a trespass against a traditionally protected area
for the purpose of retrieving evidence is a search.75
Technology introduced new issues. Over time, the government could capture the
intangible aspects of life in the telephone wires and receivers that carry our private
conversations. These were initially not given Fourth Amendment protection.76 An
emphasis on tangible property rights remained the sole theoretical basis for the
Fourth Amendment until the seminal case of Katz v. United States.77 In that case, the
undertaken in Part III, after first answering the question of whether a warrant is initially required.
Infra Part III.
71
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
72
Id.
73
See Clancy, supra note 68, at 1058.
74
See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 562, 57879 (1996).
75
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the physical occupation
of private property, a car, is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted). Jones was concerned with a government GPS tracking device adhered to a car.
Id. at 402. Jones is discussed below, at length, in Section II.A.2.
76
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
77
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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court expanded the definition of a search to include governmental intrusions that
invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy.78
In Katz, the Court considered a government listening device placed outside a
private telephone booth, a booth in which the government suspected Katz was conducting illegal gambling activity over the telephone.79 Emphasizing that the Fourth
Amendment protected the privacy interests of a citizen, the majority extended Fourth
Amendment protection to the intangible privacy interest Katz held in his private
conversation, stating that the Fourth Amendment protects peopleand not simply
areasagainst unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .80 The majority opinion
sketched out the idea of a right to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures, but without a formal test for establishing when a person could invoke this right.
It is Justice Harlans concurrence in Katz that provides the test and establishes when
a search has been conducted against intangible privacy interests. Because the other
opinions lacked a clear standard, Harlans formulation has proved influential since
the decision. The test is as follows: A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their communications where that person subjectively expected such privacy and
where society would recognize that expectation as an objectively reasonable one.81
This appears straightforward enough, but almost immediately, the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test was subject to caveats which complicate the analysis. For
geofence warrants, one exception is especially relevant: what a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.82
Because location data is held as a record by another party, an analysis as to
whether accessing location data in a search implicates a doctrine known as the thirdparty doctrine. The third-party doctrine was first sketched out in the context of cases
involving simple business records in the late 1970s.83 In sum, the Court has described
the third-party doctrine as where a person assumes a risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.84 The third-party doctrine stems from a particular conception of privacy that
views Fourth Amendment privacy as constituting a form of total secrecy.85 This
doctrine assumes that when the information is provided to a third party, the secrecy
78

See id.
Id. at 347, 349.
80
Id. at 353.
81
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82
Id. at 351.
83
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy in financial records provided from a bank to the government); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed numbers
provided from a phone company to the government).
84
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
85
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (2002).
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barrier is broken and no reasonable expectation of privacy can attach. This is an important point. If a court finds this doctrine present for the data subject to an intrusion,
no warrant need be issued for the data.
Some scholars have argued that this doctrine is both rational and serves laudable
goals.86 Rather than waiving a reasonable expectation of privacy, it makes more
sense to say that [t]hird-party disclosure eliminates privacy because the target
voluntary consents to [a] disclosure . . . of ostensibly private information.87 Further,
the third-party doctrine serves important goals. It permits observation of those
crimes that would completely take place by agents of the true criminal, be they coconspirators or an unwitting business; and, it provides clarity to law enforcement in
an unclear area of law, emphasizing which private data will definitely require a
warrant.88
In response to these rational aims, however, consider a Google users consent
to Location History (or most forms of consent to high-tech data collection for that
matter). Users either opt in with less than explicit notice given to them, or even with
good notice, without a full realization of the potential consequences to their privacy
if they opt in.89 Second, users may understand the notice they have been given, but
misunderstand the accuracy of the movement patterns as expressed in the location
data collected by tech companies.90 Where a user cannot properly understand the full
ramifications of the initial acceptance of data collection, consent is a fiction that
does not really represent true acceptance.91 Justice Sotomayor generally agrees with
this point, stating that the third-party doctrine is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks.92
Determining whether the third-party doctrine applies to location data is premature without first considering two cases on point: Jones and Carpenter. To some
extent, both cases incorporate a discussion of the third-party doctrine and of reasonable expectations of privacy in location data. So, with the understanding developed
above, this Note continues by discussing these cases to determine whether a search
occurs in requesting location data.
86

See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 588
(2009).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 57576, 58182.
89
See Every Step You Take: How Deceptive Design Lets Google Track Users 24/7,
NORWEGIAN CONSUMER COUNCIL (FORBRUKERRÅDET) 2628, 3637 (2018), https://fil.for
brukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/27-11-18-every-step-you-take.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9E36-T7EG].
90
See supra Section I.B.
91
See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 188588, 1894 (2013).
92
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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2. Jones and Carpenter: The Supreme Court Considers Location Data
As explained directly above, when determining whether government requests
for location data invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus constitute a
Fourth Amendment search, the storage of location data with a third party will implicate the third-party doctrine. In terms of clarifying this analysis, the good news
is that the Supreme Court has two recent cases, Jones and Carpenter, explaining the
Courts thinking on location data and the third-party doctrine.93 The bad news for
these cases is that only Joness concurrences are truly elucidating to broader location
data issues and Carpenter explicitly claims it is decided on narrow grounds.94 Said
another way, both cases are very applicable to questions regarding geofence warrants, but the breadth of their reach is very unclear. Still, this Note argues that both
cases suggest a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data,
and thus the Fourth Amendment presumes a warrant is required for location data.
In Jones, at issue was the governments use of a GPS device on a vehicle, placed
in violation of the warrant that permitted its use by being installed in Maryland rather
than in the District of Columbia.95 The government tracked the defendants vehicle
for twenty-eight days via a GPS device placed on the vehicle by the police department, and the defendant attempted to suppress the evidence obtained from it.96 In
holding that the installation of a GPS device . . . to monitor the vehicles movements was a search, the Court relied on the governments physical trespass of the
car, rather than the Katz expectation of privacy test.97 This reestablished the continued validity of a search being indicated by a physical trespass on private property.98
Beyond this holding, it is the concurring opinions in Jones, by Justices Sotomayor
and Alito, which offer further explanation of the unique issues attending location data,
a reasonable expectation in privacy, and the third-party doctrine.99
Justice Sotomayors concern is with a persons reasonable expectation of privacy
in the intimate details of life revealed by location data. Her concurrence notes the
unique aspects of location monitoring, which, even in the short term, generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a persons public movements that reflects a wealth
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.100 Whether by a GPS device or by smartphone location data, the precision of
93

See id. at 404, 40910; Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 41416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at
42425, 430 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
95
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 40203.
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Id. at 403.
97
Id. at 404, 40607.
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Id. at 40405.
99
See id. at 41416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (warning that the majoritys test will provide little guidance in cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance); id. at 42425,
430 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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location monitoring catalogues the habits and characteristics of an individual.101 As
Justice Sotomayor suggests, such a catalogue of location data may infringe an objective reasonable expectation of privacy.102
Justice Sotomayors concurrence clarifies that any single public activity is not
the problem, it is whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.103 The
term aggregation implies that it is the comprehensive picture provided by location
tracking and its accuracy in showing patterns of movement that matter: two things
that geofence warrants do exceptionally well. Location data has become a retrospective, unerring, and complete surveillance that outmatches other forms of surveillance
in scope and complexity.104
The depth of these issues led Justice Sotomayor to suggest it may be necessary
to reconsider the premise behind the third-party doctrine.105 Calling the doctrine ill
suited to the digital age, her concurrence stresses that data is relayed to third parties
in mundane, casual circumstances and thus she would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for
that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.106
Justice Alito also filed a concurrence that the governments actions amounted
to a search, but largely because of the reasonable expectation of privacy a person has
against the long-term tracking of their movements.107 His concurrence focuses on
what he considers the actual important issue, namely the use of a GPS for the
purpose of long-term tracking and disagrees with the majority opinion that a minor
trespass is what triggers Fourth Amendment protection.108 Although Alito critiques
the majoritys opinion on multiple points, the most relevant here is his concern that
electronic surveillance can make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.109
Given that this ability is a novel, high-tech problem without a current legislative fix,
applying existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is the best that can be done as a
stopgap.110 For Alito, short-term monitoring in public areas does not infringe a
reasonable expectation of privacy. A focus on short-term public monitoring contrasts with geofence warrants, which can easily enter private areas, into the confines
of the home, showing a pattern of movement from room to room.
101

See supra Section I.B.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
103
Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 41516 (noting that GPS monitoring is cheap, easily stored, and can be mined
for years).
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Id. at 417.
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Id. at 41718.
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See id. at 42021, 42425, 42930 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Both Justices Sotomayor and Alitos concurrences utilize the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test.111 Justice Sotomayor focuses on the aggregation of data,
which can show a comprehensive picture of an individual, emphasizing what is seen
in the data rather than the length of location tracking.112 She likewise questions the
continued validity of the third-party doctrine, where users can agree to giving over
vast amounts of data with one click. Alito, on the other hand, avoids any concerns
with the third-party doctrine. Instead, to determine whether a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed, Justice Alito focuses strongly on the length of public location
tracking as a trigger to when a search occurs, with long-term public monitoring being
more likely to be a search.113 Justice Alito does not get specific as to what constitutes
short-term versus long-term; at the very least, the GPS monitoring in Jones
twenty-eight dayssatisfied long term.114
Both concurrences apply squarely to the data of a geofence warrant. Both
concurrences concern themselves with the relative ease with which law enforcement
can obtain a complete surveillance of an individual, 115 which is a design feature of
the location data in geofence warrants. Geofence warrant location data can be
extremely detailed, offering a comprehensive picture of a persons activities for long
periods of time. But neither concurrence says how much is too much, either in an
aggregate picture of an individual or in the length of time that they have been
tracked. Thus, it seems that these concerns must be approached on an ad hoc basis,
both for courts and law enforcement. Less location data observed (both in a length of
time sense and in a private area sense) will generally favor the government that a
search has not occurred, and greater amounts of location data observed will generally favor a defendants argument that a search occurred and a warrant was required.
The Court considered location data again in Carpenter v. United States, reemphasizing many of the points raised in Jones. In Carpenter, wireless carrier
providers handed over location data to the government by means of a court order
rather than a search warrant.116 The data implicated one of the defendants, Carpenter,
in a series of robberies.117
The location data consisted of a time-stamped record of the phones location,
known as cell-site location information, or CSLI, automatically generated for the
providers business purposes.118 The court orders sought four months worth of CSLI
which provided 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenters movements during
111

See id. at 414, 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 419, 42223 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the string of robberies.119 Carpenter argued that the seizure of the CSLI without a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.120 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the court
there concluded that the detailed location information provided to the government
was mere routing information provided to a third party; and as such, the third-party
doctrine saw such routing information as a business record, to which a user had no
reasonable expectation of privacy.121
In reviewing the Sixth Circuits decision, the Court relied on Jones and distinguished the third-party doctrine. In essence, the majority holding, written by Chief
Justice Roberts, fused some elements from both concurrences in Jones.122 Chief
Justice Roberts stressed that [m]apping a cell phones location over the course of
127 days provide[d] an all-encompassing record of the holders whereabouts which
revealed not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.123 Here, crucially, both the
length of time and the patterns it demonstrated to the government would violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy, triggering a search.
The Court determined that a phones exhaustive chronicle of location information124 is distinguishable from that early line of cases that established the third-party
doctrine.125 In distinguishing location data from other business records invoked by
the third-party doctrine, the Court recognized that cell phones have become almost
a feature of human anatomy . . . track[ing] nearly exactly the movements of its
owner.126 Further, tracking by CSLI occurs before the government even knows
which suspect they intend to seek out. For CSLI, the data is transmitted to the phone
provider whenever the phone is on and provides a faithful record of the activities of
that individual, far before the government even knows they need it.127 And CSLI
implicates a vast number of individuals, as the Court noted, location information
is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States . . . . 128
Therefore, relying on Jones and distinguishing earlier cases of the third-party doctrine,
the Court held that a user maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record
119
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of his physical movements as captured through CSLI129 and to retrieve at least seven
days of CSLI records from a wireless carrier, the government needs a warrant.130
The parallels between CSLI and the location data of a geofence warrant show
why a party should normally have the same reasonable expectation of privacy in
both, but primarily because CSLI and geofence location data both reflect twin
concerns of Jones emphasized in Carpenter: a long-term picture of expressive
public movements. As for parallels, CSLI is transmitted just by merit of having a
connection to a cell tower, and the location data in a geofence warrant is transmitted
once a user has opted in to Googles location services. For the latter, the phones
precise movement is logged so long as location and data are enabled, which can
provide an extremely detailed picture of movement over time.131 And while Google
has begun to take steps to automatically delete location data, that near perfect record
is stored by default for eighteen months on Google servers.132 Further, just like
CSLI, the movement patterns accumulated by a company like Google implicate a
significant portion of the population. Precise numbers are unknown because much
of the functionality of Google location services is proprietary, but at least one billion
individuals globally use Google Maps every month.133
Chief Justice Roberts stressed Carpenter as a narrow holding,134 but the location
data in a geofence warrant can provide the same intimate window into a persons
life for the same long periods of time that concerned the Court in that case. For
example, in writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts casts the constant recordkeeping of CSLI data as tireless and absolute surveillance135 and phone companies
as witnesses ever alert, and their memory [] nearly infallible.136 The opinion
characterizes long-term location tracking as a detailed chronicle of a persons physical
presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.137 The location
129
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data in a geofence warrant shares these concerns, irrespective of how Google Location History is initially obtained by consent or for how long it is retained.
The words tireless, absolute, ever alert, or infallible are not chosen idly to describe
CSLI data. They are chosen to emphasize that society would likely find the details
in CSLI data too invasive, harming an objective privacy interest.138 Geofence location data is more invasive because of its increased accuracy and easy, cheap
capacity to be retroactively searched.
A question remains as to how the concepts of time and accuracy overlap. Chief
Justice Roberts opinion indicates that the length of time that a person is tracked is
worrisome: the Court here arbitrarily chooses seven days as too long, 139 which suggests that a longer time is worse, all things equal. Justice Alito stressed this view in
Jones, which seems to make sense because it necessarily means that a greater overall
picture of the user is obtained.140 But at what point does the accuracy of the tracking
surpass the length of time as the measure of objective reasonableness? What accurate form of location data could be too invasive for any period of time? For example,
consider that location data can easily follow an individual into areas nominally considered some of the most private and intimate, areas that the Court has previously
afforded an impressive amount of protection.141 Even a geofence warrant that limits
itself to a single day could follow a person from the interior of their home, among
the rooms of their dwelling, to the location of a crime, then to a place of worship, then
perhaps to a new home, such as that of a relative or friend, and among the rooms of
that second dwelling. This form of tracking should likely constitute a search, for it
invades so many places previously given so much Fourth Amendment protection.
For the reasons described in the concurrences in Jones and the majority in
Carpenter, it seems definitive that long-term monitoring of location data would
implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy, triggering the conduct as a search and
requiring a warrant. At the very least, per Carpenter, long-term is any capture beyond
seven days. Beyond that, what constitutes long-term versus short-term is unclear,
and the permissible capture of location data for a short period of time might be
inversely correlated with how detailed the location data is: where the accuracy of
location data is very high, the permissible window of short-term capture of location
138
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The majoritys holding stated it is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a . . . search. Id. at 2217, n.3. But the expressive language
highlighting the danger of location tracking considered all the governments actions, which
included an order for location data spanning 127 days. Id. at 2217.
140
The majority opinion in Carpenter did not suggest that a certain distance traveled by
the suspect suddenly triggered greater privacy, but that the overall record formed an intimate
window into a persons life. Id. at 2217. Nonetheless, location data records are formed based
on length of capture anyway, with a greater distance of travel likely occurring dependent on
the time requested.
141
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data is very narrow. Further, location data may be determined to be so invasive within
intimate areas that any amount of capture without a warrant is unreasonable.
B. Location Data as Content Under the Stored Communications Act
Independent of the analysis raised by the principle of Katz and the analysis in
Jones and Carpenter, a statutory framework is implicated here. The Stored Communications Act (SCA), passed in 1986, regulates, among other things, the conduct of
government actors in requesting or compelling network service providers to disclose
stored communications.142 In the statutory text, the SCA draws a distinction between
different services provided,143 a distinction that is now mostly eclipsed by an interpretation of the SCAs distinction between content and non-content information.144 In very simple terms, the focus is often whether a government actor seeks the
contents of an electronic communication, held by an electronic communications service.
If so, the SCA requires the government obtain a warrant.145 Reflecting that focus, if
the location data within a geofence warrant is interpreted by a court as content data,
a warrant is required. This is true independent of the analysis of location data
invoked by Katz, Jones, and Carpenter.
Notably, Google, as amici in United States v. Chatrie, takes the position that
location data is content and does require a warrant under the SCA. 146 The SCA
defines content as a part of an electronic communication which concerns the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.147 Applying this definition
142
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to the location data as used by Google users, Google argues that [t]he users location
itself is the substance and meaning of the data the user transfers to Google.148
Because it is a recording of movements, chosen by the user to be logged, capable of
being reviewed, edited, and deleted by the user[,] it is content more akin to a journal
or itinerary.149 Of course, it is in Googles interest to interpret it this way, given it is
their resources that are subject to query and search, and a different interpretation could
leave them subject to an even greater number of legal requests short of warrants.
Google could have a point, irrespective of their interests. The analysis of
whether location data is content is relative to how it is used, and an analogy in these
types of questions of content versus non-content is compelling:
[T]he line between content and non-content information is inherently relative. If A sends a letter to B, asking him to deliver a
package to C at a particular address, the contents of that letter
are contents from A to B but mere non-content addressing information with respect to the delivery of the package to C. 150
Location data often can be incidental to the transmission of the information itself,
as in Carpenter where CSLI data was captured merely by dint of its operation,151
or as more akin to header information that gets it from one place to another.
For geofence warrants, there is no incidental capture or mere addressing information. A user opts into this service to use for their own purposes. In this instance,
Location History data is sent to Googles servers not as an incidental metric or as
header/addressing information helping it to be routed correctly, but instead to be
logged for purposes unto itself. Google, as amici, stresses this point that the location
data is, itself, substantive as conveyed,152 implying that Google is to utilize the data
as is not only for targeted advertising but also as a service for the consumer, for example, as a recorded log or journal of movement patterns in the Google Maps service.
Prior to Carpenter, some courts had concluded that location data, in the form of
CSLI, was not content under the SCA and could be obtained by an order under
Section 2703(d) of the SCA, which does not require probable cause.153 Now, without
of the movement of a person or object. § 3117(b). It is very unclear whether this tracking
device definition, unaltered since 1986, is strictly limited to devices whose singular purpose
is to track location or instead to devices that track location and also do other things.
148
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 16.
149
Id.
150
2 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.4(d), at 46162 (3d ed. 2007);
see also In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 13637
(3d Cir. 2015) (employing this analogy in its analysis).
151
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018).
152
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 17.
153
See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commcn
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Govt, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
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directly ruling on whether location data is now considered content, those same
courts are compelled by Carpenters holding to the opposite conclusion: a Section
2703(d) order cannot be used to obtain CSLI location data because it requires less
than probable cause.154 This about face, brought on by Carpenter, suggests that
Googles amici brief may be compelling, but not for the reasons it suggests. Google
suggests that because a user can catalogue expressive activity as a substantive record
held by a third party, anything like that should be designated as a content record.155
So, because location data is such an expressive, substantive record, it is content too.
Perhaps it is simpler than that; Carpenters holding renders location data subject to
a reasonable expectation of privacy and holding otherwise under the SCAs terms
would simply create an incongruity that the courts cannot permit. So, regardless of
the actual answer as to whether location data is or is not content, some courts have
rejected the governments mere use of an SCA court order to obtain location data,156
and so the finding related to Jones and Carpenter likely controls.
III. GEOFENCE WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
Part II argued that a request for location data from a third party constitutes a
search and thus requires a warrant. Assuming that point for the sake of further analysis,
Part III continues to identify and grapple with the primary issues that arise with a
geofence warrant, focusing on the probable cause and particularity requirements.
This analysis relies primarily on publicly available geofence search warrant applications and those very few district court cases which have analyzed these issues in
geofence warrants.
Generally, the warrant framework is as follows: searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few . . . exceptions.157 So,
without a valid exception, a search requires a warrant issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate who independently verifies that the warrant satisfies Fourth Amendment
requirements.158 The first primary requirement for the issuing magistrate is to determine
that the warrant is supported by probable cause,159 a task the Supreme Court has
labeled a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit . . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
154

See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019).
Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 69.
156
See, e.g., id.
157
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The many exceptions to the warrant
requirement are not directly addressed in this Note, which instead focuses on the requirements
of probable cause and particularity.
158
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
159
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ([A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .).
The application for a search warrant must be sworn out by oath or affirmation. Id.
155
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of a crime will be found in a particular place.160 Another primary requirement is that
the warrant particularly describ[e] the place, person, or thing subject to search or
seizure,161 which makes general searches under [a warrant] impossible[,] . . . [leaving
nothing] to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.162 This particularity
requirement fulfills the objective . . . that those searches deemed necessary should
be as limited as possible.163
In focusing on what satisfies probable cause and particularity, a court aims
toward what is reasonable in those regards. If we keep that in mind, the conclusions
of Part III are relatively straightforward. For probable cause, it is more reasonable
to assume that evidence of a crime will be found in location data where the police have
established a narrow and objectively limited warrant: a warrant with a high probability
of capturing the data of those for whom probable cause has been established. Therefore, warrants that are overbroad and capture the location data of many uninvolved
individuals suffer from probable cause issues. For particularity, discretion is limited
where the police draw multiple ex ante geofence targets, restricting the search to the
initial terms of the warrant, rather than permitting any ex post sorting procedure of
the warrant returns thus reasonably avoiding the hated general warrants of the past.
Geofence warrants adhering to these ideas are more likely to be constitutionally
valid than those that do not.
A. Geofence Warrants: How to Satisfy Probable Cause
In general, probable cause does not demand the certainty . . . associate[d] with
formal trials.164 It is a flexible, common-sense standard expecting a reasonable
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the person, place, or
thing searched or seized.165 [I]t does not demand any showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false.166 What it does demand is some quantum of
individualized suspicion that suggests the person being searched is unlike those not
subject to a search.167 With such a flexible standard, however, a great amount of
deference is afforded to law enforcement and magistrate judges making probable
cause determinations.168 Practically speaking, probable cause is established by facts
160

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
162
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
163
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
164
Gates, 462 U.S. at 246.
165
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
166
Id.
167
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976); see also Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560).
168
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (Reasonable minds frequently
161
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established before the warrant is filed, and those facts are derived from, among other
things, observation, independent sources, or previously seized evidence.169 As it pertains
to geofence warrants, probable cause requires that evidence of the offense under
investigation will be found on the servers of the company from whom geolocation
data is requested. Police can potentially rely on the practical methods outlined above
to establish that relation. For example, some available probable cause affidavits (filed
in support of geofence search warrant applications) rely strongly on a form of observation, either from video surveillance170 or from eyewitness observation,171 to tie an
unknown suspect to a crime.
In the most convincing probable cause affidavits, the established facts typically
proceed as follows. They begin by identifying some set of facts that indicate the commission of a crime, an unknown suspect observed around the location of the crime, and,
crucially, an observer that saw the unknown suspect use a cell phone near the location
of the crime.172 At this point, the warrant typically generalizes, with the affiant establishing their expertise and describing the general features of cell phones, the capability
of some cell phones to pinpoint location, that Android devices usually have related
Google accounts, that Google accounts with location services enabled may have that
data stored on Googles servers, and that the observed phone could have such data.173
may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we
have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by
according great deference to a magistrates determination.) (quoting Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)); see also Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable
Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 80003 (2013).
169
See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 45455 (1948) (observation); see also
Gates, 462 U.S. at 23738 (anonymous informant); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
68283 (1985) (lawful seizure).
170
See Application for Search Warrant, In re accounts associated with the area near the
location 35.785556°, -78.617145° between 6:00pm EST and 7:00pm EST on 11-07-2016,
and Between 5:25pm EST and 6:25pm EST on 11-08-2016, Maintained on Computer Servers
Controlled by Google, Inc. (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2017) [hereinafter March 8, 2017 Geofence
Warrant], https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4388571-20170308-homicide-warrant
.html#document/p5/a410668 (relying on video surveillance footage of a suspect).
171
Application for Search Warrant, In re Accounts associated with the area near the location
35.833966°, -78.609595° Between 3:00am EST and 4:00am EST, on 06-01-2015, Maintained
on Computer Servers Controlled by Google, Inc. (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017) [hereinafter
March 7, 2017 Geofence Warrant], https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4388570-20
170307-homicide-warrant.html#document/p6/a410393 (relying on an eyewitness account of
a suspect).
172
See id. at Attachment III (One witness watched as the unknown suspect used the light
from his cellular phone to either light a path to a vehicle or look for something on the ground.);
see also March 8, 2017 Geofence Warrant, supra note 170, at Attachment III (The subject
has a CELLULAR DEVICE in his left hand that is positioned near his left ear.) (alteration
in original).
173
See, e.g., March 7, 2017 Geofence Warrant, supra note 171, at Attachment III (offering
these expert generalizations in turn).
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There is a step-by-step logic present here: an unknown suspect committed a
crime, an officer or witness observed a suspect with a cell phone near the commission
of that crime, and, if it is an Android device, Google may have location data about
that device and thus evidence of the crime. Given the deferential standard of probable cause, one could be excused for assuming probable cause on that logic alone, as
there is a good probability evidence of the crime could be there. But one would miss
what is really being asked in the query demanded of Google. The SensorVault
query, focused on a geofence location, will search all Android devices with stored
location history for the corresponding GPS coordinates.174 Beyond this, all Android
users (with Location History enabled) within those boundaries will be returned by
the warrant, but the affidavit will have provided for only one of those users, the
attendant facts linking his cell phone use to the crime and thus potential evidence of
the crime to Googles servers. Probable cause may exist for that single suspect, but it
is harder to say that probable cause exists for all the other users swept up into the warrant returns because no facts are established to state they are involved in the crime.
There are instances where the link between the crime and Googles servers is
even more attenuated. Other affidavits omit the observation of the suspects cell
phoneor even the suspect altogetherthat was present in the last example. These
other affidavits provide facts that suggest the commission of a crime. But these
affidavits lack observation, or any comparable circumstantial evidence, that suggest
the specific, unknown suspect that may have committed the crime had a cell phone
on them at or near the commission of the crime.175 Instead, these affidavits skip the
observation that existed in the last example and instead rely solely on the expert
generalizations about cell phones, location data, Android, and Google.176 In these
instances, there is a complete lack of connection between the historical facts upon
which the warrant is based and hypothetical evidence on Googles servers. It is instead
assumed that because of the ubiquity of cell phone use and the widespread market
share held by Android devices, there is a high probability of obtaining evidence of
the crime.177 Even if, for the sake of argument, it is assumed as true that there is a
high probability the suspect has a cell phone, the original issue is also still present:
there might not be probable cause for all the other users swept up into the returns.
Because this technology is still new, case law analyzing this probable cause issue
for geofence warrants is sparse. Two district court opinions, both from the Seventh
174

Google Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 1213 (Google must search across all [Location History] journal entries to identify users with potentially responsive [Location History]
data . . . .) (emphasis added).
175
See Application for Search Warrant, No. 27-CR-CV-18-4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5729046-Google-Reverse-Search-Warrant-Eden
-Prairie-Home.html; Raleigh Devices Geofence Warrant, supra note 14.
176
See, e.g., Raleigh Devices Geofence Warrant, supra note 14, at Attachment III (describing a suspected arson and mentioning nothing about a suspects cell phone use before then
generalizing about cell phones and cell phone use).
177
See, e.g., id.
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Circuit, demonstrate rationales for either refuting a finding of probable cause or
accepting a finding of probable cause.
In the first case, referred to here as the pharmaceuticals case, the government
sought a geofence warrant for an unknown suspect who received stolen pharmaceuticals
within the area outlined by the affidavit.178 After a point on warrant protocol,179 the district court began by emphasizing the scope of the warrant: a form of authority . . .
disclos[ing] . . . the identities of various persons whose Google-connected devices
entered the geofences[.]180 While the court acknowledged the fair probability that
the unknown suspect and evidence of the crime would be on Googles servers, the
proposed geofence warrant will [also] include the precise geographic location of
persons as to whom no showing has been made as to their involvement in the
offense or with the [u]nknown [suspect].181 Instead, these persons and their data are
involved with the warrant by their proximity alone, that is, just because those users
were found in the place to be searched.182 Ultimately, the district courts probable
cause analysis relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent previously rejecting a similar
argument.183 In that case, Ybarra v. Illinois, the Court concluded that an unrelated
persons mere proximity to a suspect for whom probable cause has been established
is insufficient on its own.184 Instead, the Court noted that:
Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a
person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or
178

Applicant for Search Warrant, In re Search of Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by
Google, No. 20 M 297, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165185 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2020) [hereinafter
Google I] (application initially denied on particularity grounds). The probable cause analysis
was taken up again in In re the Search of: Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 481
F. Supp. 3d 730, 74950 (N.D. Ill. 2020) [hereinafter Google II].
179
In a point on protocol, the district court found no difference between two forms of geofence warrant proposed by the government. Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 749. The first is retrieving anonymized returns that could then, on the authority of the same warrant, be compelled
into a narrower set of non-anonymized returns. Id. The second is a warrant that would only
provide anonymized returns. Id. For the second type, the government would then need to seek
further court process to turn the anonymized returns into intelligible subscriber information.
Id. Crucially, because both types could be construed by Google to include all of the devices
captured within the geofences[,] they would render the same results in the anonymized first
step between either type. Id. at 750. Thus, the second stepeither by the authority of the
initial warrant, or a follow-up subpoenais identical in substance, if not form, because both
are so easily obtained. Id. Concerned over the liberty interest already invoked in the first step,
the court determined that both types must meet Fourth Amendment principles. Id.
180
Id. at 75051.
181
Id. at 751.
182
Id.
183
See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 9092 (1979) (holding that a valid warrant with good
probable cause for a bar and bartender did not extend to a patron who was on the premises).
184
See id. at 91.
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avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the
premises where the person may happen to be.185
The district court found probable cause lacking for similar reasons, as a number
of Google users would be included in the geofence warrant returns because they
happened to be nearby.186 Their sweep into the warrant was coincidental, purely based
on spatial relation. If this reasoning regarding Ybarra is accepted, it could be applicable
to geofence warrants in two categories: those broadly drawn by scale and duration
(implicating many by geography and time) and urban geofence warrants (where the
density of users is simply much higher). Most geofence warrants, but especially those
that are broad or urban,187 will sweep up into the warrant returns numerous bystanders who will have had no rational connection to the crime, even as witnesses. The main
distinguishing feature between Ybarras facts and geofence warrants generally is the
physicality of the search. In Ybarra, the police physically searched a person within
the boundaries of the warrant.188 Geofence warrants involve a persons things (data),
held by a third party on a computer server, and analyzed after the fact to see whether
the data is really related to a crime or not. It is unclear whether this distinction, tangible
and present versus intangible and distant, would make a difference to a court.189
In the second case, referred to here as the arson case, the government sought
a geofence warrant which sought arson suspects over six target locations.190 Unlike
the pharmaceuticals case, where the geographic boundaries were in a dense, urban
area, the target locations in this case were drawn over more sparse areas, both private
and public, including commercial lots, which included company infrastructure, and
a public street and alleyway.191
Further, unlike the pharmaceuticals case, here the district court found that probable cause was present.192 To understand why, it is important to note that in both cases
185

Id.
Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 753 (Because the proposed warrant here seeks information
on persons based on nothing other than their close proximity . . . , the Court cannot conclude
that there is probable cause to believe that the location and identifying information of any of
these other persons contains evidence of the offense.).
187
See id. at 752 (noting that the geofence warrant returns would include any sidewalk
passersby, retail customers in an adjoining business and parking lot, drivers on a nearby street,
and persons in residential units).
188
See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 8889 (discussing that Ybarra was twice patted down, and on
the second, a cigarette pack containing heroin was removed from his pants pocket).
189
It did not matter to the district court, who considered the distinction a simple analogy.
See Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 753.
190
In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F. Supp. 3d 345, 351 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Some of the targets
were identical in space but set at a different time. Id. at 35253.
191
See id. at 35153.
192
Id. at 354.
186
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no suspect was observed using a cell phone during the commission of the crime.193
This is unlike those ideal affidavits outlined above where a witness or surveillance
system observed that the suspect had a cell phone. Instead, the district court in the
arson case relied on the affiants training and experience and several statements
supporting probable cause that evidence of the crime would be located at Google. 194
The affiant, an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent, noted that based
on his training and experience, it was common for co-conspirators to use cell phones
to plan and commit certain crimes, especially when the same crime (like arson) occurs
on separate dates.195 Further, there is a reasonable probability that a cell phone, regardless of its make, is interfacing in some manner with a Google application, service,
or platform.196 And anyone passing near or through the target locations . . . could be
perpetrators or witnesses to the arsons.197 The district court found probable cause,
relying on circuit precedent establishing that the statements of experts can suffice to
establish probable cause,198 the ubiquity of cell phone use, the high likelihood of
Googles overlap with most cell phones, and the common pattern of crimes like arson.
These statements, even if accurate, are generalizations based the common aspects
of a type of crime.
In addressing the argument that other Google users, neither suspect nor witness,
could be included in the warrant returns by being present within the boundaries of
the target location, the district court did not include its reasoning as part of its probable
cause analysis.199 The district court noted that the privacy concerns of uninvolved
individuals are often indirectly impacted by a search, as when the search of a house
involves occupants not suspected of a crime.200 Or when an email account or cell
phone, searched for evidence of a crime, reveals the intimate details of all those who
messaged or interacted with the inbox or cell line.201
The district court focused on one point to avoid an issue with the other Google
users implicated by a geofence warrant: [t]he proper line of inquiry is not whether
a search of location data could impact even one uninvolved persons privacy interest,
193

See id. at 355 ([I]t is important to note that there is no evidence in the affidavit that any
of the suspects possessed cell phones or used cell phones in the commission of the offense.);
see also Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 73233.
194
See In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 356.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
See id. at 35556.
199
See In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 359, 361 (including it under the subheading Additional Considerations).
200
Id. at 361 (noting that this indirect impact is present in numerous other situations and
is not unusual).
201
Id.
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but rather the reasonableness of the search, the probability of finding evidence at the
location, and the particularity of the search request.202 That probable cause is found
for the unknown suspect is sufficient, so long as reasonableness and particularity are
also found. In literal terms, a search on Googles servers has begun and ended when
all users whose data matches given warrant parameters are reflected in the returns.
Under the district courts reasoning, those other users whose data is incidentally
searched simultaneously to the suspects reflects common practice in warrants, and
because common, an acceptable practice too.
The district court distinguishes Ybarra in a footnote, dispensing with the case,
but perhaps also giving away what really makes the difference between the arson case
and the pharmaceutical case.203 It is noted that the government is not expanding the
scope of the warrant because it explicitly seeks location data for all individuals present
in the geofence within the scope of the warrant.204 So, everyone within the boundaries
of the warrant can have their data searched, useful or otherwise, because the government explicitly targeted all of them and probable cause is satisfied for all of them.205
Because all of the individuals in one instance (the arson case) may be searched and
they may not be searched in the other instance (the pharmaceutical case), the answer
likely then turns on the reasonableness of the warrant application. In the pharmaceutical case, it seems unlikely that the claim could be made that because the government
explicitly targeted an area and established probable cause as to a few individuals, all
individuals there could be searched. The reason it is unlikely is because, in actuality,
it would have potentially implicated the data of hundreds of individuals.206 It is no
stretch of the imagination to state that in a dense urban location, even a narrowly
drawn geofence could implicate thousands of individuals if the time frame is sufficiently long. In the arson case, the target locations are lightly traveled, largely empty,
commercial lots where suspicious fires have been set.207 There are roadways and
alleyways that the suspects may have used to travel either to or from the arson.208 There
are private buildings, but they are of mixed commercial use or garages.209 Although
public and private lands are involved, the implication in the district courts manner
202

Id. at 362.
Id. at 362 n.6.
204
Id.
205
See In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 362 n.6. In Ybarra, would the government
have received their warrant to search everyone on the taverns premises if they had simply
known a crime had occurred andrelying on their expertise alonegeneralized about surrounding individuals from there? But cf. 444 U.S. 85, 9092 (1979).
206
See Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (noting that the proposed government warrant
would capture location information of a vast number of individuals in the urban location).
207
See In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 35153.
208
Id. at 352.
209
Id.
203
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of speaking is that very few uninvolved users will be present in these warrants.210
Indeed, the district court in the arson case notes that there is no way to exclude the
possibility that at any given time an uninvolved Google userfor whom probable
cause could never be establishedwould not wander through the geofence boundaries.211 But when that possibility of uninvolved Google users is a near certainty,
especially if it is certain that there will be hundreds of them implicated in the
warrantas was true in the pharmaceutical casethen the finding of probable
cause for all of them is much less reasonable.
It is much more rational, then, to evaluate these opposite conclusions as to what
a court considers reasonable.212 Courts will find it easier to establish probable cause
where the likelihood of incidentally searching other Google users is low,213 because
it is reasonable to assume that most of the Google users chosen are suspects, coconspirators, or witnesses for which the government has supplied probable cause.
So, geofence applications that focus on non-urban areas, or applications that are extremely tailored and narrowed by geographic and temporal scope will have a better
chance of being accepted. Courts will struggle to grant a geofence warrant request
where the likelihood of incidentally searching other Google users is high, because
it is unreasonable to assume that probable cause extends to all of them.
B. Geofence Warrants: How to Satisfy Particularity
The text of the Fourth Amendment specifies that a warrant must particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.214 As the
Supreme Court has explained, [t]he manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches . . . the requirement ensures that the search
will be carefully tailored to its justifications . . . . 215 Courts generally require that,
to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant include: (1) the specific crime
for which probable cause has been established; (2) the place to be searched; and (3)
how the items relate to the specified crime.216 This is relatively simple in terms of
a physical search, where the description objectively narrows police officers to search
those places where the evidence of the crime would be, and to avoid those places
210

The district courts example of an uninvolved individual is a delivery truck driver entering
the geofence location, but even then it is implied he could be a witness. See id. at 362.
211
Id.
212
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967))).
213
See, e.g., Google I, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165185, at *14, n.8 (detailing with approval
a geofence warrant for an almost empty commercial parking lot where only one vehicle was
located).
214
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
215
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
216
See, e.g., United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 44546 (2d Cir. 2013).
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where the evidence of the crime could not possibly be.217 The most particular and
satisfactory of warrants will leave nothing to the discretion of the person executing
the warrant.218
It is easier said than done for courts to adapt the particularity requirement to
digital contexts.219 Professor Adam Gershowitz has noted [t]here are two fairly
narrow categories of cases in which courts tend to find particularity violations in
computer search warrants.220 A court will find a particularity violation where such
a warrant does not properly state on its face what crime the search is being conducted to find evidence of and when the search warrant contains overbroad, catchall language.221 The best likelihood for a defendant to succeed on a particularity issue
regarding a computer search warrant is to identify these issues, but such challenges
are rarely successful.222 So, a geofence warrant should, at a minimum: (1) describe
the crime for which evidence is being sought; (2) describe where the data is being
held; and (3) include specific language as to how the data relates to the crime.
When law enforcement is focusing on specific data intermingled among other
data, rather than an object with a large storage capacity, the focus of the particularity
requirement turns to the content of the relevant files rather than on the storage
devices which may happen to contain them.223 As such, to avoid being overbroad,
a warrant should describe and focus on the relevant files, if possible.224 A specific
way that courts have found data descriptions to be limited and focused is for officers
to be clear about what they are seeking 225 and to restrict their search based on date
217

See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (noting that where officers would have known one apartment
was a suspects and one was an unrelated individuals, the particularity requirement obligates
the officers to exclude the unrelated individuals apartment from their search).
218
See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
219
See generally Paul M. Ervasti, Is the Particularity Requirement of the Fourth Amendment
Particular Enough for Digital Evidence?, ARMY LAW. (Oct. 2015), at 610 (describing some
of the general difficulties related to digital evidence and the particularity requirement).
220
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 599 (2016).
221
Id. at 599600 (reviewing examples of courts sustaining particularity challenges in the
described instances).
222
See id. at 600.
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Cf. H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 72 (2009), https://www
.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN5V-Y6U8]
(citing United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009)).
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See id. (advising U.S. attorneys to focus on the relevant files . . . when the computer
is merely a storage device for evidence . . . .).
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See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
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or time.226 And, as was the case with probable cause, courts have found reason to be
lenient. Some circuits have recognized that over-seizing is an accepted reality in
electronic searching because [t]here is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic
file contains without somehow examining its contents.227
In the few geofence warrant cases that have analyzed the issue of particularity,
the warrant applications have failed the requirement if the discretion of the executing official is too broad.228 As mentioned, it can be unconstitutional to permit the
executing officer discretion in how the search will be conducted.229
Geofence warrant procedure often does permit a sort of impermissible discretion
when officers are given anonymized returns from Google.230 The reader will recall
that, in either the case of a multi-step warrant or a warrant that then must be followed
up with further legal process, Google produces anonymized device IDs in the warrant
returns which the officers often sift through, picking and choosing which data can
be attributed to suspect, witness, or non-witness.231 Although the data is anonymized,
the privacy of the data is not at issue; it is the fact that officers are sifting through
the data at all. Particularity demands a specificity that, while not exactitude, leaves
as little as possible for the officers conducting the search to decide to do.232 Particularity has been found lacking in those instances where a geofence warrant simply
provides the executing officer unbridled discretion as to what device IDs will be
followed up on.233 And, because many geofence warrants seem to rely on this
procedure, many are likely unparticular in this regard, lacking the restrictions on
police action necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
A court may come to a different result with the same warrant procedure but with
different facts. But it is likely not the procedure of sorting that is suddenly permissible, but instead the low likelihood of actual discretion. For example, in the arson
case, the district court found reasons to be lenient: the warrant was limited in time
226

See, e.g., United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995).
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228
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unbridled discretion).
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See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) ([N]othing is left to the discretion of
the officer executing the warrant. (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927))).
230
See, e.g., Raleigh Devices Geofence Warrant, supra note 14, at Attachment I.
231
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See Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 754; see also United States v. Sanchez-Jara, 889 F.3d
418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that a warrant that identified ex ante the phone to be tracked
satisfied the particularity requirement), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 282 (2018).
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See Google II, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 754.
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and location,234 and also, it was limited in scope.235 As for time and location, the
court noted with satisfaction that the data would return the location patterns of those
within the geographic boundaries for no longer than thirty-seven minutes.236 Those
locations themselves were at least implied to be limited,237 expecting that there was
likely to be few people there at all.238 The courts discussion on the scope of the
warrant arguably implicates the most important aspect as to why this warrant may
satisfy the particularity requirement where others would not: the geofence zones
have been constructed to focus on the arson sites and the streets leading to and from
those sites. Residences and commercial buildings along the streets have been excluded from the geofence zones.239 The sifting procedure is not suddenly permissible; it is not likely to be used at all. Anyone found in these locations is likely a
suspect or witness, and the officers will have no true discretion to sift among them.
As the court in the arson case found in relation to probable cause, the investigating agents took care, ex ante, to draw the geofence in a manner that implicated as
few potential Google users as possible. Because this is a prospective limitation on
the executing officer, it does act as an objective limitation on that officers discretion, as does both the time and location limitations. But the scope limitation is
arguably the most important because it recognizes and prevents what would truly
perturb the court and its Fourth Amendment analysis: capturing the data of a wider
swath of potential Google users who are almost both unrelated to the crime and who
would be sorted. Because the investigating officers provided support [to] the conclusion that location data from uninvolved individuals will be minimized, the
warrant was limited in scope, and satisfied the particularity requirement.240
What general principles might satisfy particularity in those cases unlike the
arson case, where the capture of other Google users cannot be avoided? One method
suggests that the investigating officers draw multiple narrow and specific geofence
targets and request Google to return device IDs for only those whose location data is
found in all of the targets.241 The logic here seems to easily conform to particularity
234

See In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F.3d at 35758.
235
See id. at 35759.
236
See id. at 357 (noting the longest period of time for the warrant is a thirty-seven-minute
period for one of the target locations).
237
See id. at 358 (noting the target areas are drawn to capture location data from
locations at or closely associated with the arson).
238
See id.
239
Id. (emphasis added).
240
In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location Data Stored at Google
Concerning an Arson Investigation, 497 F.3d at 358.
241
Magistrate Judge Weisman of the Northern District of Illinois developed this potential
means of satisfying particularity in response to the denial of a geofence warrant; a favorable
analysis of it was included in the pharmaceutical case, Google II. See 481 F. Supp. 3d at 75556.
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principles: these targets would be objective limitations, obtained in advance, for which
the executing officers had no true discretion in sifting through. Further, [t]he likelihood of the same device showing up in more than one of these [] geofences is
extremely low . . . which aids not only the particularity analysis, but the probable
cause analysis as well.242 So, for example, if it is known which route the suspect took
and when he likely arrived, where and when the crime likely occurred, and then which
route the suspect took and when he made his escape, a geofence warrant that sought
location data on only those devices within all of those target locations, which themselves are properly restricted in scope, could likely satisfy particularity principles.
CONCLUSION
Geofence warrants present novel problems for the criminal justice system. These
problems will not wait around for more extensive guidance; courts will face them
more and more. A few conclusions can be suggested from what is currently known.
First, there are two conclusions regarding whether a warrant is required when
executing a geofence warrant for location data. Jones and Carpenter treated location
data as a unique thing which revealed intimate facts about a given individual. A
majority in Jones and the Courts opinion in Carpenter found a reasonable expectation
of privacy for location data in their respective cases. Because the location data in a
geofence warrant is more precise, a similar reasonable expectation is very likely
invoked, and a warrant is required. Independently, courts have interpreted that
Carpenter has foreclosed the ability to obtain location data without a warrant under
the Stored Communications Act. To permit otherwise would be incongruous with
this Supreme Court precedent.
Second, consistent issues arise with regards to the probable cause and particularity requirements, especially overbreadth and impermissible discretion in the execution of the warrant. This Note ultimately concludes that law enforcement may rely
upon usual methods to establish probable cause, using special caution to limit
uninvolved users for whom probable cause cannot be obtained by drawing geofence
warrants narrowly. Further, law enforcement can establish particularity with multiple geofence target locations, within which there is a high likelihood that the only
recurring users are suspects or witnesses. This avoids the use of sorting procedures
after the fact. The ideal application for a geofence warrant is one which increases the
chances that only the suspects data will be captured by the warrant. Courts view the
Fourth Amendment requirements through the lens of reasonableness. Where the
government seeks only data for which probable cause is established and limits
officer discretion, geofence warrants are likely constitutional.
242

See id. at 756.
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This investigatory technique holds abundant potential for identifying unknown
suspects who would otherwise evade identification and further investigation. The
government has a great interest in finding those who commit serious crimes, especially when other methods have failed. This technique, like all others that invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy, must adhere to the principles of the Fourth
Amendment. With the right amount of care and specificity designed into the warrant
application, it likely can.

